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Abstract: In this article the author analyzes 
the different ways in which one can speak of 
an end of philosophy. The author shows the 
way in which the continuation of philosophy 
in our days is only achieved by overcoming 
sophistry and skepticism.
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Resumen: En este artículo el autor analiza 
las diferentes maneras en que puede hablarse 
de un ﬁ nal de la ﬁ losofía. El autor muestra de 
qué modo la continuación de la ﬁ losofía en 
nuestros días es alcanzable solo mediante la 
superación de la sofística y el escepticismo.
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H alf a century ago, when I was young, it was fashionable in Anglo-American circles to say that a criterion for mean-ingfulness had been found which rendered metaphysics as 
well as ethics meaningless1. When that effort went down in ﬂ ames, 
we were next told that a Linguistic Turn had been taken and real 
philosophizing could at last begin. Of course, by then it had be-
come a tradition of sorts to announce that all previous philosophy 
was meaningless or based on some mistake which could now at last 
be corrected. This might be called the mark of the modern, begin-
ning with Descartes. So many such revolutions followed one upon 
the other that our discipline was in a constant vertiginous spin. It 
was not only on the Continent that one heard of the death of meta-
physics or the end of philosophy. By common consent, it seemed, 
there is no longer any way to do philosophy well, so it is best not 
to do it all. Of course, it is philosophers who tell us this, repeat-
edly, from their amply endowed chairs, making a career of putting 
themselves out of business while retaining their positions. In this 
paper I wish to discuss the end of philosophy.
To say this is to utter an amphibolous sentence, not wholly 
unlike “Last night I shot an intruder in my pajamas”. When the 
Greeks spoke of the end of philosophy, “end” had the sense of telos 
or goal, the desired outcome. Nowadays, talk about the end of phi-
losophy takes “end” in its meaning of stop, cessation, terminus. 
Actually, the two senses have always gone hand in hand. One who 
wishes to espouse the end of philosophy in one sense of “end” is 
committed to rejecting it in the other sense. Thus, Plato opposed 
Protagoras the Father of the Sophists who claimed that what is true 
for me is true for me and what is true for you is true for you even 
if you are holding A and I am holding –A. As Plato saw, this posi-
tion is the end of truth; accordingly he spent what might seem an 
inordinate amount of time discussing the sophistic principle. And 
1. A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic (Gollancz, London, 1962) remains a good 
read for those interested in the archeology of the modern and the diminishing life 
span of revisionist proposals.
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so did Aristotle. The painstaking analyses of Book Gamma of the 
Metaphysics —subjected to equally painstaking analyses by Ferdi-
nand Inciarte— are a testimony to the seriousness with which the 
undermining of philosophy was taken2.
It might be said of the sophist position that, if it is true, it is 
false. That is, it is self-refuting. One who wishes to say that contra-
dictories are simultaneously true can formulate this in speech only 
by assuming that both sides of a contradiction cannot be simul-
taneously true. If nothing else, as Aristotle ultimately observed, 
the words used must mean what they mean and not the opposite 
in order to convey the thought that they mean both. Why did 
Plato and Aristotle spend so much time showing that nonsense is 
nonsense?
The sophist was in some ways the ﬁ rst pragmatist. Truth was 
not a matter of a match between a judgment and the things that 
are so much as it was effectiveness, that is, a statement’s truth was 
gauged in terms of its bringing about a desired effect.
From its very beginning, philosophy has been accompanied by 
its dark twin, sophistry. The quest for wisdom, the pursuit of truth 
has always been seen by some as impossible of realization. A history 
of anti-philosophy could be written. If it were, it would doubtless 
reveal that in our own times anti-philosophy has all but driven phi-
losophy from the scene. We are all sophists now.
Once metaphysics was rejected because it was thought to be 
false, then it was rejected because it was said to be meaningless, to 
be speaking of things of which we cannot speak, a sort of linguistic 
Kantianism. Such criticisms had the merit of supposing that the 
contradictory position was true. If one rejected some philosophical 
thinking as false, this was because it collided with the truth. Such a 
critique presupposed that there are judgments which are rendered 
true by the way things are. In these latter days, the full implications 
of the epistemological turn that philosophy took with Descartes 
2. See R. McInerny, Characters in Search of Their Author. The Gifford Lectures, Glas-
gow 1999-2000 (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 2001).
RALPH MCINERNY
122 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 50/1 (2017) 119-134
have been recognized. When this is put into a linguistic key, we are 
told that such a conception of truth is an effort to escape the net of 
language, to match language with something beyond itself3.
However eager you and I are to show the inadequacy of such 
positions, there is little doubt that they are widely accepted, and 
because they are widely accepted, the notion of truth as the con-
formity of judgment and reality is called into question. But if there 
is no reality to verify what we think or say, there is no reality to fal-
sify either. So we rejoin Protagoras: contradictories have an equal 
claim to being true because neither has any basis for its supposed 
truth. If “truth” is retained, it is only in a pragmatic sense, or what 
works, or what is an effect, and not in the sense of what accurately 
expresses what is.
More important even than confronting attacks on reason is 
the attempt to recall how reason attains its desired end. In what 
follows I will recall in its mainlines Thomas Aquinas’s approach to 
metaphysics, from time to time alluding to attacks on metaphysics. 
Others have taken the opposite tack, allowing the Heideggerian 
critique to deﬁ ne the discussion4.
3. Of interest on all this are L. Kolakowski, Metaphysical Horror (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001); H. Redner, Malign Masters (Macmillan Press, 
New York, 1997) and S. Rosen, Nihilism (St. Augustine’s Press, South Bend, 
2000). See too D. Edmonds, J. Eidinow, Wittgenstein’s Poker. The Story of a Ten-
Minute Argument Between Two Great Philosophers (Harper Collins, New York, 
2001).
4. Saint Thomas et l’onto-théologie. Actes du colloque tenu à l’Institut catholique du Tou-
louse les 3 et 4 Juin 1994. Published as a special issue of the “Revue Thomiste” 
(Janvier-Mars, 1995). “Dieu gagne-t-il à être? L’alliance séculaire entre l’être et 
Dieu, dont saint Thomas passe (à juste titre?) pour le chantre, a-t-elle été et est-
elle encore pour la pensée chrétienne un piège ou une chance? […]. Plusieurs 
auteurs se sont essentiellement attachés à l’exégèse de la pensée thomasienne elle-
même pour déterminer dans quelle mesure elle tombait sous le coup du procès in-
tenté à l’onto-théologie par Heidegger, ce qui ne va évidemment pas sans quelque 
réﬂ exion sur la signiﬁ cation et la pertinence de cette critique elle-même”. From 
the Présentation, 5.
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1. The love of wisdom
As the etymology of the term indicates, wisdom is the telos of phi-
losophy, and wisdom is preeminently that knowledge of the divine 
that is attainable by human knowers. Philosophy reaches its goal in 
theology. This is the ideal that Aristotle puts before us in the mag-
niﬁ cent opening chapters of his Metaphysics where the initial gen-
eralization —All men by nature desire to know— is traced through 
sense perception, the internal senses, memory, experience, to techne 
and episteme as knowledge of the “why” or cause. The distinction 
between practical and theoretical knowledge was adumbrated al-
ready in speaking of the external senses, with sight seen as desir-
able “even when we have no further end in view”. Techne gives way 
to episteme both of which is accomplished through knowledge of 
causes. One who has knowledge of causes is considered wiser than 
one who does not because it is the mark of the wise man that he can 
teach what he knows by explaining why. But if wisdom is knowl-
edge of principles and causes, we must ask what kind of causes wis-
dom knows. Chapter 2 of Book One develops the idea of wisdom 
carefully. It is knowledge of all things in their ultimate causes and 
for that reason can be called a divine science in two senses:
For the science which it would be most meet for God to have 
is a divine science, and so is any science that deals with divine 
objects, and this science alone has both these qualities, for 
God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be 
a ﬁ rst principle, and such a science either God alone can have, 
or God above all others5.
That the philosophical quest should end in a science that can be 
called divine is the authentic achievement of Greek philosophy. 
“Philosophy” is an umbrella term which covers a plurality of sci-
ences, but this is an ordered plurality, with all other science seen as 
5. Aristotle, Metaphysics 983a6-10.
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necessary or useful for the acquisition of that science which is called 
wisdom. Of course the science has other names as well: it is “the sci-
ence that we are seeking”, it is “ﬁ rst philosophy”; it is wisdom and 
it is theology. How can one science fulﬁ ll so many different tasks?
I need not commend to this audience the magniﬁ cent proee-
mium that Thomas Aquinas wrote to his commentary on the Meta-
physics of Aristotle6. What Thomas has to say presupposes what is 
discussed in the book he is introducing, which doubtless is why 
reﬂ ection on this proeemium is more and more fruitful the more we 
understand the Metaphysics.
All the arts and sciences are desired as conducive to man’s 
perfection or beatitude. But then, given this common aim, one of 
them must be regulative of the others and direct them to it, and it 
will be called wisdom. It is the mark of the wise man to order, not 
to be ordered. Among me, those who are defective in intellect are 
governed by those of keen intellect. Wisdom is concerned with 
the most intelligible things, for this is the basis for its hegemony 
over the others arts and sciences. But what does it mean to say that 
some things are more intelligible than others? What does it mean 
to speak of the most intelligible things? We can arrive at an under-
standing of this in three ways.
First, when we consider what makes us intellectually certain, 
namely, a grasp of causes. That is, causes are the source of under-
standing. But then, the ﬁ rst causes will be the concern of wisdom 
which rules the others7.
6. O. Boulnois points out that Martin Heidegger commented on this text in a course 
given in 1929-1930, translated as Les concepts fondamentaux de la métaphysique (Ga-
llimard, Paris, 1992). See O. Boulnois, Quand commence l’ontothéologie?, “Revue 
Thomiste” 95/1 (1995) 94-95. Boulnois’s account indicates that Heidegger failed 
to understand the text. That failure led to the views on metaphysics which have 
elicited so much undeserved comment. An understanding of the proeemium is the 
best innoculation against Heidegger’s increasingly incantatory thinking.
7. “Maxime autem intelligibilia tripliciter accipere possumus.
 Primo quidem ex ordine intelligendi. Nam ex quibus intellectus certitudinem acci-
pit, videntur esse intelligibilia magis. Unde, cum certitudo scientiae per intellectum 
acquiratur ex causis, causarum cognitio maxime intellectualis esse videtur. Unde et 
illa scientia, quae primas causas considerat, videtur esse maxime aliarum regulatrix.
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Second, when we compare sense and intellect, we note that 
the senses bear on the singular and intellect on the universal. But 
then the most intellectual science will bear on the most universal 
principles. And what are they? Being and what follows on being, 
such as the one and many, potency and act. These are presupposed 
to knowledge of this sort of thing or that and ought not to be left 
unexamined. Nor should each particular science have to treat of 
them. The common science that treats of them can be called most 
intellectual and directive of the others8.
Third, by considering the nature of intellectual knowledge. 
To the degree that something is immune to matter it has the intel-
lective power. On that basis, things most separate from matter are 
most intelligible. Why? Because intellect and what it understands 
are proportionate to one another and of the same kind since intel-
lect and the actually understood are one. What is abstracted from 
singular matter is not most intelligible (such are natural forms uni-
versally understood as treated by natural science), nor are those 
which leave aside all sensible matter only insofar as they are un-
derstood, such as mathematics. Rather it is things abstracted from 
all sensible matter both as understood and as they exist that are the 
most intelligible, such as God and the angels9.
8. Secundo ex comparatione intellectus ad sensum. Nam, cum sensus sit cognitio particu-
larium, intellectus per hoc ab ipso differe videtur, quod universalia comprehendit. 
Unde et illa scientia maxime est intellectualis quae circa principia maxime universa-
lia versatur. Quae quidem sunt ens, et ea quae consequuntur ens, et unum et multa, 
potentia et actus. Huiusmodi autem non debent omnino indeterminata remamnere, 
cum sine his completa cognitio de his, quae sunt propria alicui generi vel speciei, 
haberi non possit. Nec iterum in una aliqua particulari scientia tractari debent: quia 
cum his unumquodque genus entium ad sui cognitionem indigeat, pari ratione in 
qualibet particulari scientia tractarentur. Unde restat quod in una communi scientia 
huiusmodi tractentur; quae cum maxime intellectualis sit, est aliarum regulatrix”.
9. “Tertio ex ipsa cognitione intellectus. Nam cum unaquaeque res ex hoc ipso vim in-
tellectivam habeat, quod est a materia immunis, oportet illa esse maxime intelli-
gibilia, quae sunt maxime a materia separata. Intelligibile et intellectum oportet 
proportionata esse, et unius generis, cum intellectus et intelligible in actu sint 
unum. Ea vero sunt maxime a materia  separate, quae non tantum a signata ma-
teria abstrahunt, sicut formae naturales in universali acceptae, de quibus tractat 
scientia naturalis, sed omnino a materia sensibili. Et non solum secundum ratio-
nem, sicut mathematica, sed etiam secundum esse, sicut Deus et intelligentiae”.
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Having given these three ways of understanding “the most in-
telligible”, Thomas concludes by saying that the science that deals 
with these three is the most intellectual and master of the rest10. 
And then, addressing our surprise that the three different senses of 
most intelligible are the concern of one and the same science, he 
proceeds to show why this is the case. Here is his argument: (1) The 
separated substances mentioned are the ﬁ rst and universal causes 
of being. (2) It falls to the same science to consider a subject mat-
ter and its proper causes. (3) That is why the same science consid-
ers universal being (ens commune) and separate substances: being in 
general is the subject of which those substances are the common 
and universal causes.
Being is the predicably most universal term and thus is com-
mon to all. A science that has being for its subject will be looking 
not for the causes of this sort of being or that but of the universal 
causes of whatever is. Obviously such principles are universalia in 
causando and not in praedicando. But if this science considers the 
most intelligible in all three senses of that phrase, it does not have 
three subjects in the sense of genus subiectum, knowledge of which 
is sought and which appears as the subject of the conclusive of a 
demonstrative syllogism whose predicate is its property and whose 
middle term is what it is, its ratio or deﬁ nition. The subject of wis-
dom is ipsum solum ens commune, only being universally understood. 
It is the causes of being in common which are sought and knowl-
edge of them is the end (ﬁ nis) toward which the considerations of 
the science tend.
How can a science whose subject is being in general be said 
to be concerned as a whole with the most intelligible things in the 
third sense? Although its subject is whatever is, being taken uni-
versally, nonetheless the whole science is said to be about things 
separate from matter both as deﬁ ned and as they exist. This is so 
because “separate from matter as deﬁ ned and as they exist” applies 
10. “Unde scientia, quae de istis rebus considerat, maxime videtur esse intellectualis, 
et aliarum princeps domina”.
THE END OF PHILOSOPHY
127ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 50/1 (2017) 119-134
both to things which are never found in matter, such as God and 
intellectual substances, but also to things which can exist apart from 
matter, such as being taken universally. If to be and to be material 
were identical this would not be the case.
The three senses of “most intelligible” ground the different 
names given this science. It is called divine science or theology in-
sofar as it considers separated substance. It is called metaphysics 
because, as the consideration of being and what follows on it, it 
is taken up after natural science and thus is meta ta physika, as the 
more universal comes after the less universal. It is called First Phi-
losophy insofar as it considers the ﬁ rst causes of things.
Thomas concludes his proeemium by saying that now it is clear 
what the subject of this science is and how it relates to other sci-
ences and why it has a variety of names. What is also crystal clear is 
that what drives this science, the end it seeks, is knowledge of the 
divine. It has the subject it has in order to achieve such knowledge. 
One might object that it is in natural science that one becomes 
aware of the Prime Mover and that we do not need another science 
in order to arrive at knowledge of divine substance as causal. And 
in fact Thomas insists that it is just because such a proof occurs in 
natural science that the possibility of a science beyond natural sci-
ence and mathematics emerges11. The metaphysician asks what is 
true of natural things, not insofar as they are natural or physical, 
but just insofar as they are, and this provides a subject matter whose 
causes will be proportionate to it: that is, they will be the causes of 
being as being, and not just of a kind of being. From the point of 
view of natural things, knowing them through more or most uni-
versal predicates is not to have proper knowledge of them. To know 
a tree as a being or as a substance is to know it less perfectly than to 
know it as the kind of substance it is, namely, a tree. The formation 
of a predicably more universal subject matter, justiﬁ ed because one 
11. Hence the reiterated remark that if there were only natural sciences, natural phi-
losophy would be First Philosophy. See e.g. In XI Metaphysic., 7, 2267; In VI Me-
taphysic., 1, 1170.
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has learned by proof that to be and to be material are not identical, 
is for the sake of arriving at knowledge of the ﬁ rst causes of being.
Throughout much of the 20th century, Aristotelian studies 
were deﬁ ned by the supposed tension between understanding met-
aphysics as a general science, ontology, or as a particular science 
concerned with  separate substances, theology. But  separate sub-
stances could never function as the subject of a science, as Aristotle 
makes clear12. That knowledge of them is the point of the science 
is, of course, clear, but they are known only obliquely as causes 
of being as being. Eventually, Aristotelian studies abandoned the 
path assigned it by Werner Jaeger, the decisive turn being taken 
by Giovanni Reale13. The inﬂ uence of another German thinker has 
obscured Thomas’s teaching on the nature of metaphysics —even 
among Thomists.
A metaphysics which seeks knowledge of God received the 
name ontotheology from Martin Heidegger and provided a false 
issue to which many have devoted their scholarly energies. I do not 
propose to review those considerations here, but what I have to say 
should suggest the irrelevance of the Heideggerian problem14.
When Thomas speaks of ens commune as the genus studied by 
Metaphysics, he is of course taking the term in the sense that it has 
when one means the subject of a science, to genos to hypokeimenon, 
the genus subiectum. There is no suggestion that this is a predi-
cable genus said univocally of all things. This is clariﬁ ed when 
12. See In VII Metaphysic., 17 where Thomas is explaining Chapter 17 of Book Zeta.
13. G. Reale, Il Concetto di Filosoﬁ a Prima e l’Unità della Metaphysica di Aristotele 
(Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 1961; Fifth edition, 1993). And see the remarkable 
study by E. Berti, La Metaﬁ sica di Aristotele: Ontologia o Filosoﬁ a Prima?, in A. 
Bausola, G. Reale (eds.), Aristotele: Perché la metaﬁ sica? (Vita e Pensiero, Mila-
no, 1994) 117-143.
14. See M. E. Sacchi, El apocalipsis del ser: La gnosis esotérica de Martin Heidegger 
(Basileia, Buenos Aires, 1999). A special issue of “Revue Thomiste” appeared 
in 1995 containing the papers given at a colloquium sponsored by the journal 
in Toulouse in June, 1994. The issue was called Saint Thomas et l’onto-théologie. 
Most of the contributors accepted the Heideggerian accusation against meta-
physics as the given.
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Aristotle discusses the subject of the science he is seeking in Book 
Gamma and compares it to the subjects of natural philosophy and 
mathematics, the very discussion Thomas anticipated in his proee-
mium. The term “being” is common or universal to those things 
whose causes as being are sought in a way which is exemplied by 
“healthy” and “medical”, a way Aristotle describes with the phrase 
pollakos legomena, things said in many ways and not univocally or 
equivocally. Since the term “being” is said in many ways of the 
subject of the science but with reference to one, substance, the 
primary meaning of ‘being’ emerges as the primary subject of the 
science. As is well known, Thomas Aquinas introduced the term 
analogy in discussing this text —Aristotle does not use the Greek 
term in this way— so that he can say that “being” is said analo-
gously of the things which make up the subject of metaphysics15. 
The way in which “being” is common to the subject of metaphys-
ics is sometimes called a horizontal application of analogous nam-
ing. Important as it is, it cannot compete with what is called the 
vertical application of analogous naming, that is, the way in which 
terms are common to the subject and to the cause of the subject 
of metaphysics.
One who reads the Metaphysics with Thomas Aquinas will see the 
unhurried and careful way in which Aristotle fashions a vocabulary 
to speak of the cause of being, extrapolating from an analysis of the 
subject of the science. The analysis of natural substance aims at the 
isolation of what the term can mean when extended beyond natural 
substances. The ratio substantiae that emerges is not univocally com-
mon to natural and separated substance. The meaning of the term is 
puriﬁ ed so that it can without equivocation be applied to separated 
substance. In like manner, God is seen to be Pure Act and Good-
ness, the ﬁ nal cause of the universe. But the divine name of choice in 
15. Cf. In IV Metaphysic., 1, 534: “Quaecumque communiter unius recipiunt praedi-
cationem, licet non univoce, sed analogice de his praedicetur, pertinent ad unius 
scientiae considerationem”. See my Aquinas and Analogy (Catholic University of 
America Press, Washington, 1996) 30-47.
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the Metaphysics is “thought thinking itself’, which involves extending 
thinking beyond the instance most obvious to us to speak of God16.
2. Metaphysics as Theology
The opening of the second chapter of Boethius’s De trinitate provided 
the commentator with an occasion to discuss the three kinds of specu-
lative science, natural, mathematical and theological and the basis in 
abstaction from matter for their distinction17. St. Thomas did not get 
much beyond this point in his commentary, but he does provide us with 
a remarkable exposition of these remarks at the outset of chapter 2. And 
what he has to say of divine science or theology complements what he 
has had to say in the proeemium to his commentary on the Metaphysics.
Having in the ﬁ rst article of q. 5 discussed the criteria for dis-
tinguishing speculative science, showing that it is to be found in 
16. Of course God as Prime Mover is at the center of the discussion in Book Lambda 
of the Metaphysics. Whether or not being has been forgotten, it may perhaps be 
said that we have forgotten how to read with ﬁ tting astonishment such passages 
as this: “On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature. 
And it is a life such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for 
it is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its actuality is also pleasure. (And 
for this reason are waking, perception and thinking most pleasant, and hopes and 
memories are so on account of these). And thinking in itself deal with that which is 
best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best 
in the fullest sense. And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the 
object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with 
and thinking its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. For 
that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the essence, is thought. 
But it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the possession rather than the 
receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of 
contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good 
state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this 
compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for 
the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God’s self-dependent 
actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, 
eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God, 
for this is God”. Metaphysics, Lambda 7, 1072b13-30; cf. St. Thomas, 8. All the 
elements of a treatise on the divine names are present here.
17. Boethius, The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy, edited by H. 
F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, S. J. Tester (Loeb Classical Library-Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1978) 8.
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degrees of involvement in matter, he takes up the sciences seriatim. 
Thus it is that in article 4 he asks whether divine science is con-
cerned with what exists apart from matter and motion. The dif-
ﬁ culties he poses for an afﬁ rmative answer to that question may be 
summed up in one: if divine science is metaphysics and metaphysics 
is concerned with all being and some beings are material, metaphys-
ics must be concerned with material as well as immaterial being.
Any science has a subject matter and seeks knowledge of the 
principles of that subject matter. A solution to the problem before 
us depends on recognizing two kinds of principle. Some things 
which are causes and principles of other things are things in their 
own right; thus they are not only considered in the science of whose 
subject matter they are causes but can themselves be the subject 
matter of a different science. Other principles have no independent 
existence and thus are treated only in the science of which subject 
matter they are principles.
All the things that are share common principles in virtue of the 
fact that they are but, as the distinction just made suggests, some of 
them are predicably common (communia per praedicationem) whereas 
others are shared or common causes (communia per causalitatem). To 
say that form is common to all forms is to note that “form” is predi-
cably common or universal to them all. But to say that the sun is a 
common cause of occurrences on earth is to refer to some numeri-
cally one thing, the sun, and to recognize that its causality extends 
to many things. All things have common principles, not only in 
the ﬁ rst way (principia secundum analogiam), but also in the second 
way, such that there are existent things which are the principles of 
all things. Thomas illustrates the latter in this way: the principles 
of accidents are found in substance, and the principles of corrupti-
ble substances in incorruptible substances, and thus by degree and 
order all things can be reduced to certain principles.
That which is the principle of existing in all beings must it-
self be in a maximal way, and thus be most complete and perfect, 
and most actual. They are accordingly immaterial and, in Aristotle’s 
phrase, if the divine is anywhere it is with these. Such divine things 
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which are complete in themselves and yet the causes of all other be-
ings can be treated in two ways, either as the principle of a science 
whose subject is being in general, or as subject of their own sciences.
The distinction of kinds of principles —those which exist 
independently and can have a science of which they are the sub-
ject— provides Thomas with a way of contrasting the theology 
of the philosophers from the theology based on Sacred Scripture. 
Given the disproportion between our intellect and the most intel-
ligible in the sense of the divine, there is no way there could be 
a human science of which God were the subject. Philosophically, 
our knowledge of God is dependent upon and derivative from our 
knowledge of the things which are proportionate to our intellect, 
sensible things. “Hence divine things of this kind are not treated 
by philosophers save insofar as they are the principles of all things 
and that is why they are treated in that doctrine in which are stud-
ied what is common to all beings whose subject is being as being. 
This is the science called divine by the philosophers”18.
3. The Divine Names
Under the inﬂ uence of Heidegger’s conception of ontotheology, 
some have suggested that any names common to God and creature, 
even being, involve a denial of the inﬁ nite distance between these 
two terms. Even more notoriously, he suggests that the God of 
philosophy is necessarily a kind of deistic ﬁ rst cause19. That these 
names are analogously common is thought not to escape the impi-
ety of suggesting that God is a being among beings.
18. In Boethii de Trinitate, 5, 4, edited by P. Wyser (Société Philosophique, Fribourg, 
1948) 48; edited by B. Decker (Brill, Leiden, 1959) 194.
19. “The deity enters into philosophy through the perdurance of which we think at ﬁ rst 
as the approach to the active nature of the difference between Being and beings. 
The difference constitutes the ground plan in the structure of the essence of meta-
physics. The perdurance results in and gives Being as the generative ground. This 
ground itself needs to be properly accounted for by that for which it accounts, that 
is, by the causation through the supremely original matter —and that is as causa 
sui. This is the right name for the god of philosophy”. M. Heidegger, Identity and 
Difference, J. Stambaugh trans. (Evanston, New York, 1969) 72.
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God comes to be known from knowledge of the things around us 
and the names of these things are applied to their ﬁ rst cause. We name 
things as we know them; what is ﬁ rst and commensurately knowable 
by the human mind is the natures of sensible things; therefore it is the 
names of such things which are attributed to God whether it is a mat-
ter of the philosopher extrapolating or God revealing Himself to us 
in Sacred Scripture. The problem is always the same: how can terms 
which are appropriately used to speak of material things be used to 
speak of God? That is, how are names common to God and creature? 
How are we to understand “wise” as it occurs in “Socrates is wise” and 
“God is wise”? Thomas sees here an instance of what he calls analogous 
naming, something he regularly exempliﬁ es with “healthy”. One who 
understands the behavior of “healthy” in “Food is healthy”, “98.6 is a 
healthy temperature” and “Edward is healthy” will be in a position to 
understand how “wise” is common to God and creatures. Thomas’s 
employment of the via afﬁ rmationis, via negationis and via eminentiae is 
explained in terms of the complexity of the ratio nominis, the perfection 
signiﬁ ed, the res signiﬁ cata and the way it is signiﬁ ed modus signiﬁ candi. 
When God is said to be wise, it is the perfection wisdom, the res signiﬁ -
cata that justiﬁ es the afﬁ rmation. But, because all our names involve a 
mode of signifying that is appropriate to creatures —omne nomen cum 
defectu est quantum ad modum signiﬁ candi20— the denial of the mode is 
justiﬁ ed. It is the recognition that the perfection is found in God in a 
way that wholly transcends the creaturely mode that underlies the via 
eminentiae. Here, famously, St. Thomas says that we end by knowing 
rather what God is not rather than what He is. Of course, this does not 
mean that we do not know something of what God is. Certain names 
signify him substantialiter21. We names things as we know them, we 
come to knowledge of God from knowledge of creatures and thus ex-
tend the names of creatures to God and “they imperfectly signify Him 
because creatures imperfectly represent Him”22. Another sign of the 
20. I Summa contra gentes, 30.
21. Summa theologiae, Ia, 13, 2.
22. Ibidem, ad 1m.
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imperfection of the divine names is that we need many of them, no one 
of which expresses what He is comprehensively. Finally, by seeing God 
as the fullness of being, ipsum esse subsistens, we say that the perfections 
which are scattered and separate among creatures are uniﬁ ed in Him 
in all their fullness.
The reminder that our minds can never achieve comprehen-
sive knowledge of God should not be taken to mean that we know 
nothing of God23.
Man’s ultimate end consists of knowledge of God, imperfectly 
in philosophy, perfectly through faith and ultimately the beatiﬁ c 
vision. In these remarks, I have tried to recall what for this au-
dience are commonplaces about philosophy classically considered 
and metaphysics as the locus of the theology of the philosophers. 
As Aristotle said at the outset of the Metaphysics, our knowledge of 
the most noble and knowable things may be imperfect but it is far 
and away preferable to any other knowledge. But recognition of its 
imperfection should not lead to its effective denial. Some versions 
of negative theology are indistinguishable from agnosticism. One 
is reminded of a passage in Kierkegaard.
Heraclitus the obscure said, “One cannot pass twice through 
the same stream”. Heraclitus the obscure had a disciple who 
did not stop with that, he went further and added, “One cannot 
do it even once”. Poor Heraclitus, to have such a disciple! By 
this amendment the thesis of Heraclitus was so improved that 
it became an Eleatic thesis which denies movement, and yet the 
disciple desired only to be a disciple of Heraclitus… and to go 
further —not back to the position Heraclitus had abandoned24.
23. See J. Wippel, Quidditative Knowledge of God, in Metaphysical Themes in Thomas 
Aquinas (Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1984) 215-241.
24. S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (Doubleday, New York, 1954) 132.
